Exemplifying Rationality: Introduction

For your benefit, I present a condescending scale comprised of six levels of rationality:

Metarationality
⇓
Suprarationality
⇓⇑
Rationality simpliciter
⇓⇑
Psuedorationality
⇓⇑
Irrationality
⇓⇑
Arationality

What this scale shows is that rationality is what we might call a degreed property. For our lower-level readers, a degreed property is a property that can be had in degrees. It is important to note that this is a scale of condescension. The sole downward arrow beneath metarationality is intentional (as if a metarational acts sans metaintentionality). It serves two purposes. First, it is to prevent the confusion that ascension to metarationality is possible. It is not. But neither can a metarational descend to some inferior level. So don't be fooled by the sole downward arrow. Its second purpose is simply to remind the reader that the only relation that exists between a metarational and an inferior, should the metarational graciously choose to enter, is that of condescension. In my next six posts, I will describe each level of rationality so you can see which of the five levels below metarationality you fall into.

Trialogue on Reason

Let us consider a hypothetical scenario in which a mere rational and merely reasonable person have engaged a metarational in debate. For the sake of our illustration, let us say that the subject of this debate is the necessity of reason. Our merely rational person shall be called Hyparch, our merely reasonable person shall be called Epiphanes, and our metarational shall be called Metalogos. Now let the trialogue unfold!

Hyparch: Friends, surely it is so that the authority of reason can be traced to the very foundations of knowledge; that as long as we have reason, we shall have rational belief. For without reason, we are reduced to the irrational, which is absurd.
Epiphanes: Friend Hyparch, I understand your sentiment well, but one cannot stand upon the foundations of reason. One needs basic knowledge on which to employ this reason. You must agree, lest you be left without foundation and be considered irrational yourself.
Hyparch: My dearest Epiphanes, I fear I do not fully see your contention with my statement. Of course one needs foundations of knowledge, but why should I not be able to learn them with reason? Any reason will do!
Epiphanes: Why Hyparch! It amazes me that you do not see the circularity that drives you into madness! What you have is a castle in the air, and as elaborate and beautiful as it may be, it will fall without any foundation.
Hyparch: So you admit that I have built a beautiful castle! Why concern oneself with such a superfluous luxury as a foundation when elegance and coherence can be achieved, each wall, even each stone, supporting another! This is a far, far greater thing to achieve, O Epiphanes.
Epiphanes: Woeful friend Hyparch! What do the parts matter when the whole is fated for destruction?
Hyparch: I have told you, Epiphanes, that the parts supporting one another secure the whole! After all, you have yet failed to explain whence are you precious foundations besides reason itself!
Epiphanes: My foundations are those which evidence their very selves, especially myself.
Hyparch: Do you then build your palace upon yourself? Really, Epiphanes, you dare to call me mad?
Epiphanes: Indeed, Hyparch! I call you mad. That which seems to reveal itself stands much more strongly than nothing at all!
Hyparch: But wherefore should we rely on the appearance of self-evidence? By what means was this learnt?
Metalogos: Enough, O friends! It is clear to me that you do not understand.
Hyparch and Epiphanes: You are right, friend Metalogos. If only we knew!

And with that it is clear how metarational position is first by far the most understanding and second certain to attain an expedient and irrefutable victory in any debate by precisely the means exhibited above. Always approach a metarational with humility, for it is no simple matter for the metarational to communicate clearly with a merely reasonable person and especially a merely rational person.

What is Metarationality?

Mere rationality is far behind comparison with metarationality, for to compare them at all would be absurd. Material substance finds its telos in the earth, but dreams, being immaterial, have no such telos in this world. As surely as this is so, the rationality of this word is fated for stasis, but metarationality is destined far beyond. It is said among some mere rationals, these being minimal rationals, that rationality can be attained merely by adopting beliefs for reasons. Surely this will not do! Can a man not validly reason from the premises, "Blind men do not see," and, "The blind man saw it, too," that I am the Lord-Mayor of Cloudcuckooland? Verily, we can rationally make such a valid conclusion, but it is not a sound conclusion, for I am not the Lord-Mayor of Cloudcuckooland. Thus rationality fails to be reasonable, and even a merely reasonable man is far behind the metarational. For a reasonable man reaches conclusions for rational reasons, and might I add noncontradictory reasons, but a metarational has no use for such hindrance to the ascertation of true conclusions. Metarationality reaches any true conclusion by being there, so reaching is behind the concern of a metarational. Now I must condescend to even lower depths that I have thus far so that the merely reasonable might understand. The metarational is not irrational, for the irrational man is without rationality, whereas the metarational has transcended it, understanding the whole of rationality at once. Understand, O reasonable one, if you can, that irrationality and metarationality are not related terms in the least; truly they could not be more separate. With that I conclude, having only hinted at a dream of the reflection of the tip of the iceberg. Any more would drive the reasonable man to disconbobulation unto overflowing and the merely rational man into the chains of madness.