Why we are so wise.

It is true that the whole of all our discourse is precisely an exhibition and an explanation of our wisdom, but to deal with such wisdom explicitly and with concentration is yet warranted. The matter at hand does attain a degree of specificity when elaboration is sought via an elaboration on the meaning of our topic. By endeavoring to determine why we are so wise, it is inexorable that we must answer how we came to be so wise; therefore, why we are so wise is a matter of origin. What then are the origins of such wisdom?

It should be obvious to anyone with even the faintest connection to the realm of sense and reason that the sort of wisdom that is metarationality is an extraordinary sort of wisdom. It is made thus precisely by its origin; however, this is not to be misunderstood, as non-metarationals are wont to misunderstand at even the slightest provocation of complexity. Here we refer to the origin of the metarational, the manifestation of metarationality, not of metarationality itself. Thus we see the dual origin of such a manifestation, first in metarationality, which itself manifests, and second in the metarational, in whom metarationality is made manifest.

Even more important is this dual origin in light of the dual nature of the self, not only of the mind and body, but also within the mind. If indeed the Philosopher is right to say that man is a rational animal and a rational soul, then surely this is so. The metarational, therefore, is obviously a metarational animal, for the metarational is a metarational soul. This accounts for the metrational animal. The metarational soul must be understood by similar analogy to the rational soul, which is a soul having rationality. It is important that even the simplest reader grasp this point. Now the soul, which bears only a linguistic difference from the mind, is separate from the quality of rationality, meaning a soul can exist without rationality. Furthermore, a soul can transcend rationality, granting it metarationality. Thus the metarational is a metarational soul, for the rationality of the metarational has transcended rationality itself.

Why we do not write such excellent books.

It is the woeful truth, which surely we above all know, that the truth is not easily grasped by those who are not among us. For this reason it is an enormous challenge, even for us, to diminish the truth, which is diminishing the goodness of our words, in order to extend an articulation on countless obvious points, lines of thought of which we are aware only in the simultaneity of their parts. The slowness of it all is plainly breathtaking, and it is a truly painstaking task to speak of atoms when there is a living organism of which to speak, all the while gasping for breath. Furthermore, I do not incline toward atomism, thinking it false. Thus to limit ourselves by the bounds of the binding of a book is nearly impossible.

It is not only the vastness of the whole that discourages us, but there are also the matters of magnifying and of echoing parts. Every understandable point is both divisible beyond ordinary comprehension, and our inclination to parse every point is absolutely exhaustive. Just the same, from the implications of each and every point follow unimaginably many more, at least for the abilities of a non-metarational. The metarational view of truth might be called the fractal model of truth, for from any point, there is incomprehensibly much to see within, and there is just as much to see without.

Exemplifying Rationality: Introduction

For your benefit, I present a condescending scale comprised of six levels of rationality:

Metarationality
⇓
Suprarationality
⇓⇑
Rationality simpliciter
⇓⇑
Psuedorationality
⇓⇑
Irrationality
⇓⇑
Arationality

What this scale shows is that rationality is what we might call a degreed property. For our lower-level readers, a degreed property is a property that can be had in degrees. It is important to note that this is a scale of condescension. The sole downward arrow beneath metarationality is intentional (as if a metarational acts sans metaintentionality). It serves two purposes. First, it is to prevent the confusion that ascension to metarationality is possible. It is not. But neither can a metarational descend to some inferior level. So don't be fooled by the sole downward arrow. Its second purpose is simply to remind the reader that the only relation that exists between a metarational and an inferior, should the metarational graciously choose to enter, is that of condescension. In my next six posts, I will describe each level of rationality so you can see which of the five levels below metarationality you fall into.

Trialogue on Reason

Let us consider a hypothetical scenario in which a mere rational and merely reasonable person have engaged a metarational in debate. For the sake of our illustration, let us say that the subject of this debate is the necessity of reason. Our merely rational person shall be called Hyparch, our merely reasonable person shall be called Epiphanes, and our metarational shall be called Metalogos. Now let the trialogue unfold!

Hyparch: Friends, surely it is so that the authority of reason can be traced to the very foundations of knowledge; that as long as we have reason, we shall have rational belief. For without reason, we are reduced to the irrational, which is absurd.
Epiphanes: Friend Hyparch, I understand your sentiment well, but one cannot stand upon the foundations of reason. One needs basic knowledge on which to employ this reason. You must agree, lest you be left without foundation and be considered irrational yourself.
Hyparch: My dearest Epiphanes, I fear I do not fully see your contention with my statement. Of course one needs foundations of knowledge, but why should I not be able to learn them with reason? Any reason will do!
Epiphanes: Why Hyparch! It amazes me that you do not see the circularity that drives you into madness! What you have is a castle in the air, and as elaborate and beautiful as it may be, it will fall without any foundation.
Hyparch: So you admit that I have built a beautiful castle! Why concern oneself with such a superfluous luxury as a foundation when elegance and coherence can be achieved, each wall, even each stone, supporting another! This is a far, far greater thing to achieve, O Epiphanes.
Epiphanes: Woeful friend Hyparch! What do the parts matter when the whole is fated for destruction?
Hyparch: I have told you, Epiphanes, that the parts supporting one another secure the whole! After all, you have yet failed to explain whence are you precious foundations besides reason itself!
Epiphanes: My foundations are those which evidence their very selves, especially myself.
Hyparch: Do you then build your palace upon yourself? Really, Epiphanes, you dare to call me mad?
Epiphanes: Indeed, Hyparch! I call you mad. That which seems to reveal itself stands much more strongly than nothing at all!
Hyparch: But wherefore should we rely on the appearance of self-evidence? By what means was this learnt?
Metalogos: Enough, O friends! It is clear to me that you do not understand.
Hyparch and Epiphanes: You are right, friend Metalogos. If only we knew!

And with that it is clear how metarational position is first by far the most understanding and second certain to attain an expedient and irrefutable victory in any debate by precisely the means exhibited above. Always approach a metarational with humility, for it is no simple matter for the metarational to communicate clearly with a merely reasonable person and especially a merely rational person.

What is Metarationality?

Mere rationality is far behind comparison with metarationality, for to compare them at all would be absurd. Material substance finds its telos in the earth, but dreams, being immaterial, have no such telos in this world. As surely as this is so, the rationality of this word is fated for stasis, but metarationality is destined far beyond. It is said among some mere rationals, these being minimal rationals, that rationality can be attained merely by adopting beliefs for reasons. Surely this will not do! Can a man not validly reason from the premises, "Blind men do not see," and, "The blind man saw it, too," that I am the Lord-Mayor of Cloudcuckooland? Verily, we can rationally make such a valid conclusion, but it is not a sound conclusion, for I am not the Lord-Mayor of Cloudcuckooland. Thus rationality fails to be reasonable, and even a merely reasonable man is far behind the metarational. For a reasonable man reaches conclusions for rational reasons, and might I add noncontradictory reasons, but a metarational has no use for such hindrance to the ascertation of true conclusions. Metarationality reaches any true conclusion by being there, so reaching is behind the concern of a metarational. Now I must condescend to even lower depths that I have thus far so that the merely reasonable might understand. The metarational is not irrational, for the irrational man is without rationality, whereas the metarational has transcended it, understanding the whole of rationality at once. Understand, O reasonable one, if you can, that irrationality and metarationality are not related terms in the least; truly they could not be more separate. With that I conclude, having only hinted at a dream of the reflection of the tip of the iceberg. Any more would drive the reasonable man to disconbobulation unto overflowing and the merely rational man into the chains of madness.